I. Introduction
A municipality, under its police power, has the right to regulate activities for the protection of the health, safety and welfare of its community. The regulation of signs and billboards for safety and aesthetics falls within that police power. In the Village of Skokie v. Walton on Dempster, Inc.119 Ill.App.3d 299, 456 N.E.2d 293 (1st. Dist. 1983) the court firmly established that a municipality has the right to regulate the aesthetics of a community, including signs erected in the municipality. As with any municipal ordinance, a sign code is subject to constitutional limits on the municipality's police power. There are two significant constitutional concerns which must always be addressed when developing, drafting and reviewing sign code ordinances. First, and foremost, is the First Amendment which protects the right of free speech. Second, a municipality in regulating existing signs by seeking their removal must act so as to not take property without due process of law or payment of just compensation if due. An ordinance drafted within these constitutional limitations will allow a municipality the authority to regulate signs and beautify its community.

II. Aesthetics Regulations
A municipality has the right to regulate signs and establish a sign code to improve the aesthetics of its community. A sign code generally regulates the size, number and location of signs on private property. Most municipalities elect either to place their sign code in their code of ordinances or in their zoning ordinance. Although both are permissible, placing the sign code within the code of ordinances is generally preferable.

Traditionally, zoning ordinances have been challenged as they are applied to individual property. Property owners have been successful in claiming a denial of substantive due process under the Illinois Constitution if a zoning ordinance, as applied, is arbitrary and unreasonable under the standards established by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1957 in LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill.2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65. By placing a sign code in the zoning ordinance, a municipality may be subject to a challenge for a particular sign at a particular location under the LaSalle factors.

By placing the sign code in the code of ordinances, the sign code would be treated like any other building code or regulatory ordinance and not put to the same standards as under LaSalle. The only test the court would impose as to a substantive due process challenge would be whether or not the entire ordinance as adopted was reasonably related to serving a legitimate interest of the community. This is a more difficult legal challenge for a sign owner to overcome.

Any sign code that is adopted must set forth standards by which either an administrator, or commission if so appointed, can properly apply those standards. Simply adopting an ordinance which gives unbridled discretion in deciding whether or not a sign permit should be approved, without specific standards, would not be upheld.

The standards of the ordinance need not necessarily be rigid. It can provide for a mechanism of relief. That mechanism must set forth specific standards for relief from the sign code ordinance. For example, when a proposed sign falls within the intent and design criteria of a sign ordinance, relief can be granted because of peculiarities of the specific location and site. Assuming all of these principles are in place in a municipal sign code, those regulations should be upheld.

III. The First Amendment
While a municipality has the right to regulate sign codes under its police power, those regulations cannot violate the principles of the First Amendment. A municipality may not regulate the right of free expression. A municipality may, however, regulate the time, place and manner of that expression. Therefore, so long as the sign code does not attempt to regulate the content of the sign, the municipality may regulate the size, location and manner in which the sign is presented. The only instance of where a municipality may be able to regulate the concept of the sign would be if the sign message falls within the municipal definition of obscene. A municipality may prohibit obscene messages, or restrict what could be displayed on signs for adult uses. Excalibur Group v. City of Minneapolis, 116 F.3d 1216 (8th Cir. 1997).

In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that a municipality in adopting a sign code may not favor commercial speech over non-commercial speech. Allowing off-premises advertising signs to sell products while prohibiting a political candidate's advertising is impermissible. Generally, non-commercial speech, the advocacy of a particular position on a public issue, is afforded greater protection under the First Amendment than commercial speech. A municipality can prohibit all offsite advertising signs. See, South Lake Property Associated, Ltd. v. City of Morrow, Georgia, 112 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1997).

Time, place, and manner regulations, are constitutional under First Amendment jurisprudence if (1) they "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech," (2) "they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest," and (3) "they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." A municipality may regulate the size of that sign, the location of the sign and the time in which the message can be displayed. City of Waterloo v. Markham, 334 Ill.App.3d 744, 175 Ill.Dec. 862 (1st Dist. 1992). While a municipality may regulate non-commercial speech with regard to signs, it may do so only if it provides an available forum for that expression. An ordinance which, for example, prohibits all political signs on private property and does not give an individual the opportunity to express his or her viewpoint on a particular subject is unconstitutional. See, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994). [See also, Pica v. Carno, 907 F.Supp. 795 (D.NJ 1995), where the court held that a municipal sign ordinance which banned all non-professional signs without a permit violated the First Amendment rights of an individual who wanted to protest a development.]

The general theme that can be found in all non-commercial cases is that, with regard to public expression, an individual or property owner has the right to display his message. Any attempt at prohibiting the display of that message without the opportunity for that individual to express their opinion would be subject to scrutiny and such an ordinance would not be upheld. The best example of this would seem to center on cases involving the United States flag. See, Village of Schaumburg v. Jeep Eagle Sales Corporation, d/b/a Jeep Eagle of Schaumburg, 285 Ill.App.3d 481, 221 Ill.Dec. 679. An ordinance which attempts to regulate size and the number of U.S. flags that can be flown will not be upheld.

IV. Elimination of Non-conforming Signs
Once a municipality determines that it wishes to regulate or upgrade the existing permitted signs to improve the appearance of the community, it is faced with the challenge of eliminating non-conforming signs, some in which owners have made substantial financial investments. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the taking of property by government without just compensation. Therefore, any sign ordinance which calls for the immediate removal of a previously permitted but now non-conforming sign without compensation would generally be held to be unconstitutional.

The issue of eliminating of non-conforming uses is not novel but has been a zoning issue for many years as to uses. Traditionally, non-conforming uses have been eliminated through amortization schedules. They allow for depreciation of the use of the property over a sufficient enough time such that their elimination does not result in a constitutional taking. A similar mechanism can be applied to signs. Such a procedure was upheld in the case of the Village of Skokie v. Walton where a maximum seven year amortization schedule had been adopted. Shorter periods have been upheld. A municipality may instead choose to eliminate non-conforming signs only when the property owner has chosen to change or alter the sign or the premises upon which the sign is located.

Generally, both processes takes some time before the effects of the change in sign code make a significant change on the appearance of the community. If a municipality desires a shorter period of time within which to improve the aesthetics of its community, it must be prepared to pay for such changes. That could take two forms: compensating the property owner for the elimination of the existing sign or providing incentives to property owners such as providing design services or financial assistance to improve the signs and possibly the appearance of their property.