A Crash Course in Federal Land Use Law
By Thomas G. DiCianni
Defense attorneys, claims handlers, risk managers, and all others whose responsibilities include protecting public entities from liability have no choice but to become familiar with a host of governmental practices that can ultimately lead to federal civil rights liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Section 1983 encompasses a wide range of potential "constitutional torts" challenging the versatility of government liability practitioners, and attracting significant public attention along the way.
The potential civil rights liability that might result from land use regulation by government agencies has occupied the lower end of the publicity chain, at least in the popular press. It's not that land use decisions lack significance or importance, and it certainly is not that these always controversial decisions are not fraught with exposure. Land use regulation presents a field of potential catastrophic land mines for government entities, exposing them to multiples of millions of dollars in liability, making other aspects of governmental liability pale in comparison.
The reason for the lower profile of land use civil rights litigation may be nothing more than the higher profile of other types of cases. Often there's sex in employment discrimination actions, violence and suspense in police misconduct cases, and scandal and intrigue in claims driven by political activity. There is a reason why television and movies are filled with cop dramas, both fictional and reality based, and an Emmy will never be won by a show about the weekly challenges of a zoning board of appeals.
Nevertheless, while lacking the popular appeal of other types of disputes, land use regulation has managed to rouse the passions of all sorts of special interests, pitting land planners, environmentalists, and conservationists against developers and property rights advocates, with various trade and lobbying groups lining up on both sides. The federal courts have historically been cautious about getting involved in these disputes. After all, what is more local than a city or township's decision on the placement of a particular type of structure on a piece of land? Federal courts have repeatedly expressed their unwillingness to assume the role of a super board of zoning appeals for every landowner turned away by a local commission. See, e.g., Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The Courts of Appeals were not created to be 'the Grand Mufti of local zoning boards. . .' ," citing Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989)); and Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) ("This case presents a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the trappings of
constitutional law. . . ."). But there is enough money at risk and enough interagency and philosophical dispute in these cases to keep the persistent advocates knocking on the federal courthouse door.
The reluctance of federal courts to recognize and develop constitution-based remedies to resolve local land use disputes has broken down a bit in recent years. In the past decade or so, the Supreme Court has issued some monumental decisions that have advanced in a big way the federal law of land use regulation. Every so often lawyers confront watersheds in governmental liability. Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), created the "Monell claim" under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against government entities. A trilogy of High Court decisions (Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)), solidified the First Amendment rights of public employees to bash their bosses with some impunity. Other liability trends have flowed from the Court's piqued interest in a particular issue that expanded governmental liability. With the past decade of developments, the time has arrived for all defense attorneys, claims handlers, risk managers, and other government officials who deal with liability issues to get a crash course in the brave new world of land use regulation in the federal courts.
The best place to start may be at the end. The Supreme Court's latest land use decision, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001), involving the recurring theme of a developer's high hopes of turning swamp land into a vacation paradise, provides a convenient jumping off point to initiate the uninitiated into the world of federal land use law. The decision presents somewhat of a microcosm of that world, and may even provide a glimpse into its future. This article will examine the Palazzolo decision, and in doing so provide a guide for the neophyte on land use litigation in the federal courts. Those beyond the need for a primer need not turn the page just yet, since one lawyer's simplified explication of the Palazzolo decision may be of some use even to the experienced.
Palazzolo's Paradise
Forty years ago Anthony Palazzolo first devised a plan to develop 20 acres of coastal property in Westerly, Rhode Island, a vacation town with historical significance for Revolutionary War and War of 1812 battles. Palazzolo, whose poetic name, derived from the Italian for "palace" (see Merriam, "The Palazzolo Palaestra," Zoning & Plan.L.Rep., Dec. 2000, at 93), planned a series of projects that the State, unfortunately for Palazzolo, found less than palatial. Eighteen of Palazzolo's 20 acres were wetlands, needing substantial fill for any construction. Two applications in the early 1960s to fill the land were denied. A third application in 1966 for a much more limited project involving a private beach club was also denied.
Time passed, and in 1983 Palazzolo submitted a new proposal, again hoping to fill the entire marshland. By now, a corporation wholly owned by Palazzolo, which held the property as title owner, had folded, and Palazzolo had taken title. A State council had also been formed to protect the State's coastline. No building on coastal wetlands was allowed unless the council granted a special exception, which by State statute was allowed only when the development proposed served "a compelling public purpose which provide[d] benefits to the public as a whole as opposed to individual or private interests." 121 S.Ct. at 2456. The application was denied, as was a 1985 application that proposed a project requiring the filling of only 11 of the 18 wetland acres. Palazzolo then sued, alleging that his property had been "taken" by the State without just compensation.
With the table now set, the uninitiated are prepared to delve into the core of federal land use law.
The Taking
Any understanding of federal civil rights challenges to local land use regulation begins with the constitutional concept of a "taking." The Fifth Amendment, best known for its catalog of procedural rights for those accused of crimes, also provides that "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The constitutional land use claim, then, turns on whether the governmental regulation of a landowner's property constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment, entitling the owner to compensation.
There are other constitutional provisions that may limit the government's ability to regulate private property. Landowners will sometimes argue that a regulation violates Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, because it is arbitrary and capricious, constituting an abuse of governmental power. See, e.g., Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd., v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 1997). This nebulous and judicially unpopular theory, however, is generally seen as precluded by State court remedies, or subsumed within takings analysis, or defeated by the slightest showing of a rational basis for the regulation. As a result, substantive due process has been an impotent federal weapon in landowners' efforts to overcome local land use restrictions. See, e.g., Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 1999); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, supra; Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has also been invoked to challenge limitations on the use of land-again, however, without great effectiveness. Landowners asserting an equal protection violation will allege that their property was treated differently from similarly situated property based on some improper reason. E.g., Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 1998). That theory may have received a breath of new life from the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), which recognized an equal protection claim for a "class of one" who has been the victim of vindictive governmental action based on ill will. That theory and some of its implications were examined a year ago on these pages. Diamond & DiCianni, "Irrational Government," October 2000 For the Defense 23. A true equal protection violation, however, even with the Olech twist, has, at least so far, been too difficult to prove and too infrequently occurring in the land regulation context to cause any significant concern about federal liability exposure.
Federal challenges may also come from other constitutional sources, such as the First Amendment (e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994)), or the procedural component of the Due Process Clause (e.g., Hartland Sportsman's Club, Inc. v. Town of Delafield, 35 F.3d 1198 (7th Cir. 1994)). However, the seat of constitutional limitation on governmental land use regulation lies in the concept of a taking. The inexperienced lawyer, then, must begin with an understanding of this basic concept.
When Does A Taking Occur?
There are two types of taking-the physical occupation or invasion of property, and the regulatory taking, which itself consists of two types. The physical occupation or invasion of property is the simplest taking concept. When a government literally takes a person's property for a public purpose, a taking occurs. If a city decides to build its municipal parking lot, or a public park, on a private landowner's property, there's a taking, no matter how necessary to the public interest the taking may be, and regardless of how small the property taken.
For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a New York statute that required a landlord to permit the local cable television company to install certain facilities on rental property, necessary to provide cable television to the tenants, effected a taking. That a public purpose supported the statute did not make it any less of a taking. The Fifth Amendment contemplates that property taken will be taken for a public use, and public necessity does nothing to relieve the government of the requirement that compensation be paid to the landowner.
That the property invaded might be minuscule also makes it no less taken. In Loretto, the property taken spanned the diameter of the cable wire stretched along the surface of the rental buildings. The cable occupied that property at the government's insistence, and by doing so effected a taking for which just compensation must be paid.
A physical occupation taking rarely makes its way to federal court, despite efforts to stretch the concept. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987) (government regulated leases between utility companies and cable television operators did not effect a physical occupation taking); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (mobile home park rent controls did not effect a physical occupation taking of the park owner's property). Generally, physical occupation takings are confined to State condemnation actions, where the value of the property, to establish "just compensation," is usually the sole issue. These actions conclude with the property owner tendering a deed to the public entity in exchange for just compensation. When a landowner believes that the government has de facto taken property without following the condemnation procedure, the landowner, in most states, can file an "inverse condemnation" action, forcing the government into an eminent domain proceeding in which, if the court agrees that a taking has occurred, just compensation will be determined.
The federal takings battleground has been chiefly occupied with disputes over "regulatory takings." These involve regulations, such as zoning and building restrictions, which do not invade the property, but limit the owner's ability to use it. The concept of a regulatory taking emanated from an observation by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it would be recognized as a taking." Takings, then, can result from government regulations which do not effect a physical invasion of the property by the government, but which regulate the use of the property in a manner that "goes too far." There are two types of such regulatory takings.
The "Categorical" Regulatory Taking of Lucas
The easier of the two regulatory takings to identify, generally, is the "categorical taking," recognized by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The categorical, or Lucas, taking involves a land use regulation that denies the owner of all economically beneficial use of the property. In Lucas, the landowner argued that the State's Beach Front Management Act, which prevented the owner from erecting a home on his beach front property, deprived him of all "economically viable use" of the property, therefore effecting a taking. The argument was that the public purportedly obtained environmental and aesthetic benefits from restrictions on construction on beach front property, but at the expense of the landowner, who was deprived of the opportunity to use that land in an economically beneficial way. Hence, a taking.
The Supreme Court agreed, and found that once a factual finding is made that the regulation deprives the property of its economically viable uses, the State can only defend the action, and its regulation, and thereby avoid paying just compensation, by showing that ownership of the property did not inherently include the right to develop it in an economically viable way. For example, where common law nuisance principles might prohibit construction on a particular piece of property, an enacted regulation prohibiting such construction would not constitute a taking, because the property right allegedly taken was never one of the "bundle of rights" that attached to that property. Prohibitions on building on an earthquake fault, or on the side of a volcano, might qualify as regulations depriving the property of all economically viable use but not taking the property.
The Lucas taking determination is often blurred by the rule that a minimal value left to the property by the regulation still deprives the property of all economically beneficial use. But landowners and their attorneys who press takings claims sometimes erroneously equate a significant diminution in the value of the property to this minimal value exception. A regulation that diminishes the value of property affected by it, as do many common zoning and land use rules, does not effect a categorical taking, even if the reduction in value is severe. The property must be left with virtually no economic value, or just a few crumbs of value, for the categorical taking to occur.
The Penn Central Regulatory Taking
The more difficult regulatory taking to identify, often referred to often as a "Penn Central taking," from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), involves a land regulation that falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial use of the property, but nevertheless results in a taking based on an intricate court-applied balancing test. Penn Central involved New York City's application of its landmarks preservation law to designate the landowner's building as a landmark site. The designation severely restricted the owner's ability to alter or use the property in a way that might conflict with the historical or architectural character of the property. The landmark designation did not deprive the property of all beneficial economic use, but it did limit the ability of the owner to use the property in various ways. The Supreme Court found no taking, applying a test that balanced the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interfered with the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the owner, and the character of the government action.
A Lucas categorical regulatory taking requires the court to look at what economic uses the property is left with, after all prohibited uses are eliminated. This analysis is not without complexities, but the Penn Central taking is a blurry quagmire in comparison. Add to this difficult scenario the fact that courts often confusingly splice together the Lucas and Penn Central concepts, (see, e.g., Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 1996)), and the result is that the uninitiated-and experienced land use litigators as well-can find themselves charting mysterious waters where Penn Central takings are at issue.
Other Takings Concepts
Inexperienced land use lawyers, as part of their initiation rite, must become familiar with some of the other concepts that permeate takings actions. These concepts provide some of the hotter issues in takings litigation, and are sure to be encountered by anyone managing or defending a land use claim.
- The Relevant Parcel
One crucial question raised in many regulatory takings cases involves identifying the relevant parcel at issue. This has sometimes been called the "denominator problem." See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed.Cir. 1994). The issue surfaces when a large parcel can be subdivided into smaller lots, and some, based on the applicable regulations, can be readily developed, but others cannot be developed at all. Denominator questions abound. Does a Lucas taking occur regarding the restricted lots, or does the entire parcel have to be viewed as a whole? If the parcel is viewed as a whole, does the allowable development leave the owner with more than "crumbs" so as to defeat a Lucas claim?
"Relevant parcel" questions also impact the Penn Central analysis, on the issues of the economic impact of the regulation and the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the owner. Courts have applied various factors to determine the relevant parcel, but until the Supreme Court definitively addresses the denominator problem, both Lucas and Penn Central regulatory takings claims have a measure of uncertainty, at least where larger parcels subject to varying development restrictions are involved.
- Exactions
Regulatory takings deal generally with various building and zoning restrictions on the use of property. However, takings analysis also applies when the government allows the owner's proposal, but only if the owner gives something of value to the public-an exaction-to mitigate against the deleterious effects of the development on the public at large. The Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), provide the takings rule on such exactions. Nolan/Dolan, a species of the Penn Central takings analysis, created a two-part test to determine whether an exaction is a taking requiring just compensation: there is no taking if there is a nexus between the State interest reflected in the exaction, and the degree and extent of the exaction is roughly proportionate to the negative impact of the development.
In Dolan, a store owner applied for approval to build an addition to her store, and to pave her parking lot. The city would allow the project only if she dedicated part of her land for a public park-a greenway-to minimize some of the increased surface water runoff and flooding that would result from paving the parking lot, and for a pedestrian/bicycle path to relieve some of the traffic congestion the expansion might bring to the city's business district.
The Supreme Court found the exaction to be an unconstitutional taking. The city passed the first prong of the two-part test, because its State-mandated land use management program had as its legitimate goals controlling drainage and traffic congestion in its business district. The second leg, however, failed. The city failed to prove that the same drainage concerns could not be met merely by requiring the landowner to maintain as open space the land the city would take for the greenway. Also, the city could not prove that the additional travelers the expansion would produce would in any way be alleviated by another path for bikers and pedestrians. Although mathematical precision is not required to prove the second part of the test, the city failed to show even "rough proportionality" between the public burden and the exaction.
- Temporary Takings
Restrictions that lead to a regulatory taking need not be permanent. A restriction in place even for a limited period of time can constitute a taking for the time it is in effect. At one time courts presumed that the only remedy for a regulatory taking was a judicial restraint on the oppressive regulation. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), the Supreme Court held that government action that effects a taking even for a limited time, a temporary taking, is compensable.
Temporary takings cases have their own subset of takings issues. What type of government action can constitute a temporary taking? How long does an application have to be delayed before a temporary taking does occur? Certainly a normal delay in processing an application for approval of a particular development is not a temporary taking. But what about an inordinate or unreasonable delay, or a negligent one? What about a moratorium on development while impact studies are conducted?
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held that a moratorium on building or development while a land use plan was formulated and clarified was not a Lucas taking, because the future right to develop or build on the property had economic value. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the Tahoe-Sierra holding (121 S.Ct. 2589); its eventual decision promises to provide some much needed guidance on the issue of temporary takings.
The Williamson Ripeness Judicial Punt
Given that every property this side of the moon has some use or building regulation attached to it, and many contain restrictions quite aggressive in their limitations on development, particularly in light of growing movements over the past few decades for open space and environmental protection, landowners seeking relief from local restrictions have increasingly asserted whatever variety of takings claim might even remotely fit their situation. Add in other creative constitutional challenges, and it might be expected that the federal courts would have trouble avoiding the "super zoning board" status they so greatly eschew. One federal court door-barring measure that has been extremely effective is the "ripeness" doctrine, expressed most eloquently in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The basic tenet of this doctrine, the "Williamson ripeness doctrine," is that if a regulatory taking occurs only when a regulation goes too far, the federal courts cannot determine whether a taking has occurred until they know exactly how far the regulation goes. Therefore, the federal courts can "punt" takings cases back to the State until the agency regulating the property makes its final decision on the property's development, and the landowner has exhausted all State avenues of relief.
Williamson involved a proposed residential subdivision of, initially, over 700 homes, which was rejected based on a density restriction. Over several years the owner submitted various revised proposals, all of which were rejected with suggestions for alterations that might pass muster. The frustrated property owner eventually filed suit, alleging a temporary taking of its property, and a jury awarded a verdict for the owner.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the case was not ripe. If federal courts must determine whether a regulation goes too far, the Court reasoned, the land regulator must have the opportunity to demonstrate how far the regulation actually goes. The landowner could have submitted even more scaled back proposals, and State procedures for reviewing whether the rejected proposals were reasonable were never pursued. Hence, a takings claim is not ripe until the government entity makes a final decision regarding the allowable use of the property, and all State procedures that might allow the property owner relief from that final decision, including State claims for compensation, are exhausted.
The ripeness doctrine is jurisdictional in federal court. Unlike other federal "punting" procedures, such as abstention and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (each of which bear mention but would need their own articles for fair treatment), the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear an unripe claim. The Williamson doctrine does not allow the court discretion. The court must punt on that jurisdictional fourth down. Moreover, the Williamson ripeness doctrine is applicable to takings suits in State court, because even there a case must be ready for adjudication before a court can adjudicate it. A State court is just as unready as a federal court to determine if a land regulation goes too far until it becomes known how far the land regulations go.
The Williamson punt is one with hang time, too. Land use disputes, particularly complex ones regarding large developments, are never resolved quickly. If a proposal is rejected, the property owner goes back to the drawing board to attempt to come up with a proposal that might be approved. The next proposal might be rejected, giving the property owner further insight into what might ultimately get approved. The process can last decades. See, e.g., Pecora v. County of Cook, 323 Ill.App.3d 917, 752 N.E.2d 532 (2001), where the appellate court in year 2001 decided the validity of a rezoning application first filed with the zoning board in 1981. As a result, when a case is kicked out of court based on Williamson, it usually stays out. Given enough time, lawsuits settle, more palatable land plans are submitted and approved, property is sold, or in some other way, as the Williamson doctrine contemplates, the problems are solved locally. Ripeness under Williamson is a powerful barrier to litigating the merits of takings claims.
Palazzolo's Ripe Claim
Now back to Palazzolo, where the lawyer uninitiated in land use practice can see these concepts at work. After the repeated rejections of his vacation paradise proposals, Palazzolo vented his frustration with a takings suit in State court. The lower courts refused to address the merits, based on the Williamson doctrine. Palazzolo's latest proposal before suit would have filled 11 of the property's 18 wetland acres. The lower court reasoned that there was still some question about whether the State council would allow a development that required filling fewer of the wetland acres. If losing 11 acres of wetland was too much, what about 5, or some other lower number. The Rhode Island reviewing courts agreed, paving the way for review of this classic takings case by the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court first found the Williamson doctrine inapplicable, concluding that further proposals by Palazzolo could not satisfy the regulations, because the compelling public purpose standard was unlikely to be met. The Court found a takings claim ripe, and Williamson inapplicable, when the local regulatory agency lacks discretion to permit any development, or the permissible uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty. The Court found the council's decision plain: "On the wetlands there can be no fill for any ordinary land use. There can be no fill for its own sake; no fill for a beach club, either rustic or upscale; no fill for a subdivision; no fill for any likely or foreseeable use. And with no fill there can be no structures and no development on the wetlands. Further permit applications were not necessary to establish this point." 121 S.Ct. at 2459. One might argue that conclusion, as the dissent did, but the majority was obviously convinced that attempts at development going back to 1962 were not just ripe, they were overripe and needed to be picked and tasted.
The High Court offered another potentially provocative insight into the ripeness doctrine. The State argued that even apart from the wetlands obstacle to Palazzolo's paradise, he still needed zoning approval from the town of Westerly, and a permit from another State agency for a sewage system. Having never applied for these approvals, the State argued, Palazzolo never fully ripened his claim.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The regulations preventing the development were those that restricted filling wetlands. That other legitimate regulations may limit the use of the property could go to damages, but unless the development limitations at issue, the wetlands fill restrictions there, were based on the landowner's failure to satisfy other regulations, other applicable regulations do not affect ripeness under Williamson.
The Court then pushed on. It rejected an argument that Palazzolo lost his right to claim a taking because he took title, albeit from his own defunct corporation, after the wetlands regulations were enacted. The Court found that the State cannot escape an unreasonable development limitation simply because a landowner might prefer to sell the property rather than litigate the oppressive regulation.
The Court then allowed the case to morph from a failing Lucas claim to a viable Penn Central case. The State had argued that there could be no Lucas taking because Palazzolo's parcel contained two upland acres which could be developed without being filled, having a $200,000 value. The Court agreed, because "[a] regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property 'economically idle'." 121 S. Ct. at 2465. However, although the two valuable acres were more than a few crumbs, the Court held, the regulations may still go too far based on Penn Central, despite a protest from the State that a Penn Central claim was never pled. The Court then remanded the case for a determination of whether Palazzolo's property was taken under Penn Central.
The majority opinion then ended with a cliffhanger. Palazzolo argued that although the $200,000 value of the upland property was more than a few crumbs, the wetland lots were still worthless. Therefore, they were taken-the denominator problem again. But the Court would not address the issue because Palazzolo argued it too late. The issue was waived and will have to wait for another case to be considered.
Does the Palazzolo decision foreshadow the future? Possibly. The Court has been cautious and measured in addressing takings claims, but never before has it passed on more opportunities to use Williamson to avoid one. Are the "super-zoning board" fears subsiding, and is the Williamson blockade being loosened? The decision also raises some new possibilities. Since landowners who obtain the property with notice of the allegedly oppressive regulation can still press a takings claim, will future cases reflect a new breed of land speculator, who looks not just for land with a potential for profitable development, but also for properties hindered by regulations that may not survive a constitutional challenge, with the payoff being "just compensation" for the taking? Palazzolo also leaves some gaping and lingering questions. A post-regulation purchase of property should certainly affect the Penn Central elements that examine the economic impact of the regulation and the owner's commercial expectations. But how would it affect a Lucas claim? And does $200,000 of value for an 18 acre parcel set a benchmark for distinguishing the crumbs from the muffin?
Conclusion
The uninitiated may find some of these takings concepts as mushy as Rhode Island found Palazzolo's salt marsh, with a need to fill the murkiness with a solid ground of understanding. Nevertheless, we hope we've at least scratched the surface here enough to point the uninitiated in the direction necessary to get started in evaluating, managing, and defending land use civil rights cases. With that clearer understanding, the claims professional can bring about better results.
Author
Thomas G. DiCianni is a partner in the Chicago law firm of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C. In his practice, he focuses on public entity and public official liability insurance and defense. Mr. DiCianni is a member of the Defense Research Institute.
Reprinted from For the Defense, November, 2001, published by DRI, the magazine for defense, insurance and corporate counsel.
|
